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The Sweet Escape: Effects of Mortality Salience




This research demonstrates that exposure to death-related stimuli can increase
consumers’ amounts of purchasing and consumption. We demonstrate that con-
sumers who have been recently reminded of their own impending mortality wish
to purchase higher quantities of food products (and actually eat higher quantities)
than do their control counterparts. This effect occurs primarily among low-self-
esteem consumers. We explain our findings in terms of escape from self-aware-
ness. Low (but not high) self-esteem participants overconsume in response to a
mortality salience activation as a means to escape from self-awareness. We also
address alternative explanations for these effects.
Fear of death is inherently rooted in human nature. Tocounter this fear, humans have a basic predisposition
to avoid threats to continued existence. Faith in one’s cul-
ture and bolstering one’s self-esteem can provide a pro-
tective shield against the anxiety that results from aware-
ness of the inevitability of death. Current events such as
terrorist attacks or natural disasters can dramatically in-
crease the salience of death-related concerns (Pyszczynski,
Solomon, and Greenberg 2003). For example, in the after-
math of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the
media documented evidence of Americans’ desire to “seize
the day” by engaging in excessive consumption (Cosgrove
2001). This overconsumption took the form of buying ex-
pensive, luxury products (White and Leung 2002) as well
as bargain shopping, stocking up on canned goods, and
overconsuming sweets (Hubler 2001). This anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that increased mortality salience (MS) may
lead consumers to excessively consume as a way to cope
with thoughts of impending mortality. To date, only a hand-
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ful of empirical studies have addressed the effects of MS
on consumer behavior (Kasser and Sheldon 2000). One ex-
ample (Ferraro, Shiv, and Bettman 2005) focused on dietary
choices from a given assortment of products, whereas our
current research examines the quantity of products pur-
chased and consumed (Chandon and Wansink 2006).
In a series of experiments, we test the effects of MS on
the consumption quantity of food and drink products, both
hypothetical (experiments 1, 2, and 4) and actual (experi-
ment 3), as well as the moderating role of consumers’ self-
esteem. We demonstrate that consumers who have been re-
cently reminded of their own impending mortality wish to
purchase higher quantities (and actually eat higher quanti-
ties) than do their control counterparts. This effect is more
pronounced for low-self-esteem consumers than for high-
self-esteem consumers. We also examine various alternative
explanations for our results. Using both mediation and mod-
eration analyses, we demonstrate that low, but not high, self-
esteem consumers overconsume in response to an MS ac-
tivation as a means to escape from self-awareness.
MORTALITY SALIENCE AND
CONSUMPTION
Since September 11, 2001, Americans have become in-
creasingly aware of their own inevitable mortality (Spencer
and Crossen 2003). Becker (1973) argued that people
counter their fear of death by creating a cultural worldview,
which gives meaning and order to the world. According to
terror management theory (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, and
Solomon 1986), this cultural worldview establishes an anx-
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iety buffer between the individual and the uncertain uni-
verse. Reminding people of their own mortality causes them
to bolster their own cultural worldviews and makes them
defensive toward threats to their worldviews. For example,
Greenberg et al. (1990) showed that manipulating MS leads
to stronger preferences among Americans toward those who
praise the United States than among those who criticize it.
Another way to counteract this fear of death is to maintain
a high level of self-esteem, which may provide a buffer
against the fear of death (Solomon, Greenberg and Pysz-
czynski 1991). Upon activation of MS, individuals increase
behaviors that bolster their self-esteem. For example, Arndt,
Schimel, and Goldenberg (2003) found that MS increases
intentions to work out when fitness is viewed as an important
source of self-esteem (Harmon-Jones et al. 1997).
Individuals can also cope with their existential concerns
through their consumption behavior (Arndt et al. 2004). For
example, Mandel and Heine (1999) found that consumers
exposed to death-related information demonstrated in-
creased interest in purchasing luxury brands (compared to
nonluxury brands), which may reinforce a consumer’s social
status within a consumer-driven culture. Furthermore, Kas-
ser and Sheldon (2000) found that MS participants, com-
pared to control participants, projected higher salaries for
themselves in the future, and they expected to spend more
on pleasurable items such as clothing and entertainment.
These prior studies support the notion that materialism might
represent a dominant cultural worldview (Arndt et al. 2004).
Materialism is defined as a belief that the acquisition of
material possessions (which are often status-laden) will
make one happy (Richins and Dawson 1992). While related
to materialism, we instead choose to study the purchase and
consumption incidence (Chandon and Wansink 2006) of
consumable household products such as food and drinks,
which are unlikely to be accumulated in large quantities as
a means of signaling status.
Other research has suggested that MS can affect consum-
ers’ choices via self-esteem striving. Ferraro et al. (2005)
found that, after exposure to an MS prime, female consumers
were more likely to choose to eat chocolate cake (compared
to a fruit salad), but only when they were low on body
esteem. The authors argued that females with higher body
esteem preferred the fruit salad as a means to bolster self-
esteem as a defense against mortality anxiety. Rather than
focusing on a choice between two food items such as cake
and fruit salad, our research focuses on how MS affects the
quantity of consumption. We demonstrate that MS individ-
uals, both male and female, want to consume higher quan-
tities of both hedonic and utilitarian products (i.e., the cake
and the fruit salad). Our findings suggest that MS consumers
who are low in self-esteem engage in increased consumption
because they wish to escape from self-awareness rather than
to bolster self-esteem. By focusing on the immediate sen-
sations resulting from disinhibited consumption (Heatherton
and Baumeister 1991), they are able to avoid confronting
their existential anxieties.
OVERCONSUMPTION AS ESCAPE FROM
SELF-AWARENESS
According to objective self-awareness theory (Duval and
Wicklund 1972), awareness of the self is an aversive state
in which the self is compared, often unfavorably, to acces-
sible standards. Self-awareness increases when individuals
are reminded of themselves, for example, when facing a
mirror (Duval and Wicklund 1972). When self-awareness
is high, discrepancies between the actual self and the ideal
self (or societal and cultural standards) become more salient.
Individuals in a high state of self-awareness tend to try to
reduce such discrepancies. For example, self-aware individ-
uals are more accurate in their reports of their own person-
ality traits (Pryor et al. 1977) and emotions (Scheier and
Carver 1977) and less likely to exhibit aggression against
others (Scheier, Fenigstein, and Buss 1974) than individuals
who are not self-aware. In other words, people in a state of
high self-awareness are less likely to deceive themselves or
others about their own character traits and attitudes and thus
may feel the need to change their behavior in order to better
conform to ideal standards.
Individuals who feel unable to meet ideal standards may
try to escape this aversive state of self-awareness by turning
their attention away from themselves. Attempts to escape
self-awareness may result in extremely self-destructive be-
haviors such as alcohol abuse, suicide (Baumeister 1990),
or binge eating (Heatherton and Baumeister 1991). Alter-
natively, individuals may engage in less-destructive behav-
iors in order to avoid self-focus, such as television viewing
(Moskalenko and Heine 2003) or disinhibited eating of
foods such as chocolate or cookies (Polivy, Herman, and
McFarlane 1994).
An individual’s self-esteem may be threatened by
thoughts of mortality if the individual fears dying without
leaving a significant mark on the universe. Two well-estab-
lished strategies to try to counteract or buffer such fears are
(1) bolstering one’s self-esteem and (2) defending one’s
cultural worldview (Greenberg et al. 1986). We examine a
third strategy, escape from self-awareness, as an alternative
means to counteract a mortality threat. Prior research has
demonstrated a link between MS and high levels of self-
awareness. For example, Silvia (2001) showed that self-
awareness can increase thoughts of mortality. Conversely,
thoughts of mortality might also increase self-awareness.
Alternatively, MS might make self-awareness particularly
aversive. Highly self-aware individuals may feel that alter-
native strategies for buffering MS, such as self-esteem bol-
stering and worldview defense, are not viable for them, since
such strategies require a certain level of self-delusion. For
example, Arndt et al. (1998) found that MS participants
spent less time in cubicles containing a mirror (study 1) and
spent less time writing stories about their internal thoughts
(study 2) than did control participants.
By extension, we expect that awareness of death will lead
consumers to demonstrate higher levels of consumption of
such products as food and drinks, because one way to avoid
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anxiety-laden reminders of self-awareness is via disinhibited
consumption. While engaging in disinhibited eating, indi-
viduals are able to narrow their attention to the immediate
sensations resulting from eating and drinking, thereby avoid-
ing existential thoughts (Heatherton and Baumeister 1991).
Consistent with this reasoning, ego threats (Heatherton, Her-
man, and Polivy 1992) and self-esteem threats (Polivy et
al. 1994) have been shown to increase the amount of eating
among restrained eaters. Therefore, engaging in consump-
tion may be one way for individuals to counteract the threat
of death. Hence, we propose that MS will lead to excessive
consumption. We also expect self-esteem to moderate these
proposed effects, as described in the next section.
SELF-ESTEEM AND OVERCONSUMPTION
Excessive consumption, as a means of escape from self-
awareness, might take the form of either overeating or ex-
cessive shopping (or both). Compulsive spenders demon-
strate lower self-esteem than other consumers (Faber and
O’Guinn 1992), and they often employ spending as a means
to enhance self-esteem (Hanley and Wilhelm 1992). Simi-
larly, there is a high correlation between binge eating and
low self-esteem (French, Story, and Perry 1995). Therefore,
although not central to our theory, we expect individuals
with low self-esteem to exhibit higher consumption levels
than those with high self-esteem. More importantly, we ex-
pect self-esteem to moderate the effect of MS on consump-
tion levels.
Ferraro et al. (2005) found that MS caused only high-
body-esteem consumers to choose fruit salad over cake,
since their bodies were viewed as an important source of
self-esteem. By choosing a fruit salad, they could avoid
gaining weight and continue to use their bodies as a source
of self-esteem. However, the question remains of what Fer-
raro et al.’s (2005) low-body-esteem participants, who dem-
onstrated the strongest effects, were doing while the high-
body-esteem consumers were bolstering their self-esteem.
Individuals low in body or self-esteem are unlikely to bolster
their esteem by eating additional calories. Instead, by choos-
ing the cake, we believe that they are following an escape
strategy (Heatherton and Baumeister 1991) rather than a
self-esteem-striving strategy, to avoid existential threat.
Individuals are frequently motivated to maintain high levels
of self-esteem, in part because it protects them from the po-
tential anxiety resulting from MS (Pyszczynski et al. 2004).
When self-esteem is high, individuals experience a relatively
low level of death-related anxiety and thus may not need to
use any coping strategies or defenses in the face of MS. High-
self-esteem (HSE) individuals may even implicitly engage in
self-affirmation as a way to enhance self-integrity and protect
oneself against such ego threats (Schmeichel and Martens
2005). However, low-self-esteem (LSE) individuals experi-
ence a relatively high level of death-related anxiety, which
causes them to engage in defensive behavior or self-enhancing
strategies in order to counter their fears of death (Pyszczynski
et al. 2004).
When LSE individuals are given the opportunity to bolster
their self-esteem (e.g., by giving higher ratings to political,
cultural, or religious in-groups vs. out-groups), they will do
so, presumably in an attempt to cope with existential anxiety
(Harmon-Jones et al. 1997). However, when faced with the
decision of how much to consume (e.g., of snacks and
drinks), their viable options are unlikely to be effective in
bolstering self-esteem. While HSE individuals have the self-
esteem resources to face a mortality threat head-on (i.e.,
without changing consumption strategies), LSE individuals
are unlikely to feel bolstered by keeping consumption levels
constant. Furthermore, they are unlikely to feel bolstered by
decreasing their consumption of food (since they tend not
to view their bodies as meeting cultural standards; Ferraro
et al. 2005). Finally, they are unlikely to feel bolstered by
increasing consumption levels, since this behavior will only
increase the distance between their own bodies and ideal
standards. Therefore, LSE individuals have no other choice
but to follow a different strategy: escape from self-aware-
ness. Following an escape from self-awareness strategy
should disinhibit consumption (Heatherton and Baumeister
1991), thereby increasing consumption quantities.
H1: Self-esteem will moderate the effect of MS on
the consumption quantity of food and drinks.
The positive effect of MS on consumption quan-
tity will be stronger for LSE consumers than for
HSE consumers.
We present a pilot study and four experiments that ex-
amine MS effects on consumption patterns. In experiment
1, we test hypothesis 1, which predicts an effect of MS on
consumption quantities of food and drinks that should be
stronger for LSE consumers than for HSE consumers. In
experiments 2–3, we examine the extent to which escape
from self-awareness mediates the effect of MS on con-
sumption quantities. Finally, in experiment 4, we heighten
the level of self-awareness and examine whether it mod-
erates the influences of MS and self-esteem on consumption.
In summary, we provide evidence that consumers try to
defend themselves against the potential anxiety induced by
thoughts of death by increasing the quantity of consumption
as a means to escape from self-awareness.
PILOT STUDY
An initial pilot study investigated whether MS affected
the quantity of food and drink items that individuals wished
to purchase, regardless of self-esteem levels. Participants,
32 students enrolled in a summer marketing course, were
randomly assigned to either the MS condition or the control
condition. The MS participants completed an essay that ad-
dressed the following: (1) please briefly describe the emo-
tions that the thought of your own death arouses in you,
and (2) jot down, as specifically as you can, what you think
will happen to you as you physically die and once you are
physically dead. The control participants were given the
following: (1) please briefly describe the emotions that the
thought of visiting the dentist arouses in you, and (2) jot
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down, as specifically as you can, what you think will happen
to you the next time you have a painful procedure done at
the dentist’s office (Rosenblatt et al. 1989). Then they com-
pleted the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS),
which measures affect (Watson, Clark, and Tellegen 1988),
and were asked several filler questions. The purpose of these
filler tasks was to allow time for activation to spread while
removing thoughts of death from immediate consciousness
(Greenberg et al. 1994). Finally, they circled all of the items
from a prepared grocery list that they intended to buy in
the next week, including fresh fruits, fresh vegetables, fresh
meat, canned items, snacks, canned meat, beverages, and
frozen food.
MS participants selected significantly more total items
( vs. 23.28; , ) than didMp 30.64 F(1, 30)p 7.47 p ! .01
control participants, including significantly more fresh veg-
etables ( vs. 3.67; , ),Mp 5.50 F(1, 30)p 9.99 p ! .005
fresh meats ( vs. 3.33; , ),Mp 4.50 F(1, 30)p 4.15 p ! .05
canned meats ( vs. 1.22; ,Mp 1.86 F(1, 30)p 3.84 pp
), and frozen foods ( vs. 1.44;.05 Mp 2.07 F(1, 30)p
, ). Consistent with numerous findings in the6.04 p ! .05
terror management literature (Greenberg, Solomon, and
Pyszczynski 1997), participants’ levels of positive and neg-
ative affect, as measured by the PANAS, did not differ
significantly as a result of the manipulation. Therefore, our
findings cannot be explained as the result of positive or
negative affect ensuing from the manipulations. The PANAS
measures of positive and negative affect also were not in-
fluenced by the independent variables and did not influence
our dependent variables in any of the subsequent studies
and thus are not subsequently reported.
These results provide preliminary support for the idea
that MS individuals want to consume a larger quantity of
products than do others. Furthermore, these findings are
inconsistent with an explanation that our participants simply
wish to “eat, drink [and be merry]” (Ferraro et al. 2005).
An increased desire to purchase not only snacks and drinks,
but also fresh and frozen vegetables, as well as fresh and
canned meats, seems to imply that participants are stocking
up for reasons other than pure hedonic pleasure.
EXPERIMENT 1
The goal of experiment 1 was to test hypothesis 1, which
suggests that self-esteem may moderate the effects of MS
on planned purchases of food and drinks. We also varied
the given budget from $75 to $150, reasoning that partici-
pants might blow their budgets more when they were given
smaller budgets. Thus, we used a 2 (MS: death vs. dentist)
# 2 (self-esteem: low vs. high)# 2 (budget: $75 vs. $150)
between-subjects design.
Method
In exchange for partial course credit, 392 marketing stu-
dents completed the questionnaire. As in the pilot study,
participants were randomly assigned to either the MS con-
dition, which included an essay about what would happen
when they die, or the control condition, which included an
essay about what would happen when they went to the den-
tist. They next completed the PANAS and filler questions.
We then told them to imagine that they were hosting an
informal party for friends and to circle the items on a hypo-
thetical shopping list of items they might buy for a party.
They were allowed a budget of either $75 or $150. The list
contained 79 possible items, including the following cate-
gories: snacks (23), dips (10), cookies (12), crackers (7),
beer (9), liquor (9), nonalcoholic beverages (5), and mis-
cellaneous items such as balloons and cake (4). Each product
was listed on a separate line, with the brand, size, and price
of the product. There was also a blank page to allow par-
ticipants to add any other items they wished to buy. We
measured self-esteem using the Rosenberg self-esteem scale
at the end of the questionnaire (Rosenberg 1989).
Results
We performed a 2 (MS: death vs. dentist) # 2 (self-
esteem: low vs. high; median-split) # 2 (budget: $75 vs.
$150) between-subjects ANOVA. The analysis of variance
revealed a main effect of the MS manipulation on the total
number of items chosen. MS participants selected more
items from the grocery list ( vs. 22.73;Mp 25.64
, ), spent more total dollars (F(1, 384)p 6.62 p ! .01 Mp
vs. $125.02; , ), and spent$139.85 F(1, 384)p 6.10 p ! .01
a higher percentage of their budgets ( vs. 113%;Mp 131%
, ) than did control participants. NotF(1, 384)p 7.38 p ! .01
surprisingly, there was also a main effect of budget, with
individuals who were given a higher budget choosing more
items ( , ) and spending moreF(1, 384)p 52.01 p ! .0001
money ( , ) than those who hadF(1, 384)p 72.37 p ! .0001
a lower budget. The amount of the budget did not interact
with the MS manipulation.
There was also a main effect of self-esteem on the num-
ber of items chosen ( vs. ;M p 26.01 M p 22.82LSE HSE
, ). Furthermore, the MS # self-F(1, 384)p 3.96 p ! .05
esteem interaction reached significance ( ,F(1, 384)p 4.25
). As predicted in hypothesis 1, the MS effectp ! .05
emerged as significant for LSE consumers (F(1, 384)p
, ) but not for HSE consumers (8.19 p ! .005 F(1, 384)p
, ). LSE consumers chose more items from the0.17 p 1 .50
grocery list in the MS condition ( ) compared toMp 29.06
the control condition ( ). For HSE consumers,Mp 23.37
there was no significant difference between the MS and the
control condition ( vs. 22.21). Figure 1 illustratesMp 23.39
these results.
Discussion
The results of experiment 1 demonstrate that MS leads
to increased food and drink consumption, particularly for
consumers with low self-esteem. In the next section, we
further discuss our proposed mechanism (escape from self-
awareness) and distinguish it from another potential expla-
nation of our results (self-regulatory failure), which we ar-
gue is unlikely to account for our results. We then present
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FIGURE 1
EXPERIMENT 1 RESULTS: THE EFFECTS OF MORTALITY SALIENCE AND SELF-ESTEEM ON TOTAL ITEMS SELECTED
three experiments in which we provided empirical evidence
for the role of escape from self-awareness in explaining MS
effects on consumption behavior.
EXAMINING THE PROCESS: ESCAPE
FROM SELF-AWARENESS OR SELF-
REGULATORY FAILURE?
Our proposed theoretical model suggests that escape from
self-awareness is the explanatory process for the effects of
MS on overconsumption. However, self-regulatory failure
(Baumeister, Heatherton, and Tice 1993) might provide an
alternative explanation for our expected findings. For ex-
ample, Gailliot et al. (2006) recently found that MS partic-
ipants exhibited diminished performance on measures of
self-regulation such as a Stroop task, a logical reasoning
task, and a puzzle-solving task. Therefore, it is possible that
our participants might demonstrate a lower level of self-
control due to MS, thereby wishing to consume a higher
quantity of food or other products. For example, ego-
depleted consumers have been shown to demonstrate higher
levels of impulsive spending (Vohs and Faber 2007). How-
ever, we believe that escape from self-awareness provides
a superior explanation for the MS# self-esteem interaction
that we have found. In fact, Gailliot et al. (2006) measured
self-esteem in several studies but found that it did not mod-
erate the effects of MS on any of their dependent variables.
Furthermore, other prior research has established that high
self-esteem can have a negative effect on self-regulation.
For example, under conditions of ego threat, HSE individ-
uals may set higher goals for themselves, thereby setting
themselves up for failure (Baumeister et al. 1993). In fact,
when faced with MS, HSE individuals (but not LSE indi-
viduals) increase the number of risky decisions they make,
despite substantially increasing their risk for failure (Landau
and Greenberg 2006). When people strive for high self-
esteem, they are motivated to view themselves positively
and therefore may have difficulty self-regulating because
they fail to correctly appraise their current state relative to
an ideal state (Crocker and Park 2004). In other words, HSE
individuals might feel immune to the negative effects of
either overeating (telling themselves “I can stand to gain a
few pounds”) or overbuying (telling themselves “I can afford
to buy what I want”). Therefore, if our results can be ex-
plained in terms of differences in self-regulation, we might
expect HSE individuals to be more susceptible to the effects
of MS than are LSE individuals. On the contrary, our find-
ings thus far have demonstrated stronger effects of MS for
LSE individuals than for HSE individuals. Furthermore, if
we can measure participants’ desire to escape from self-
awareness (e.g., via a choice to sit in front of a mirror or
away from a mirror or via the use of first-person pronouns;
Arndt et al. 1998; Dixon and Baumeister 1991) and establish
this measure as a mediator between MS and consumption,
we can strengthen the case for escape from self-awareness
as the explanation for our effects. Since only LSE consumers
change their consumption quantities as a result of MS, we
expect mediation to occur only for LSE consumers.
H2: For low-self-esteem consumers, escape from
self-awareness will mediate the relationship be-
tween MS and consumption quantity.
If MS makes self-awareness feel more aversive, what will
happen if we further magnify LSE participants’ level of self-
awareness? The prior literature suggests two possibilities.
On one hand, Arndt et al. (1998) found that MS participants
spent less time in front of a mirror than did control partic-
ipants, due to a wish to escape self-awareness. Therefore,
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it is possible that our MS participants who are forced to sit
in front of a mirror will exhibit a stronger wish to escape
self-awareness, leading to a higher consumption level com-
pared to MS participants who are not placed in front of a
mirror. On the other hand, Goldenberg et al. (2005) dem-
onstrated that MS caused high-body-mass-index women to
restrict their eating, particularly in situations where social
comparison (and thus objective self-awareness) was likely.
Therefore, it is also possible that the combination of MS
and a mirror might reduce consumption levels. We propose
that individuals must have the opportunity to escape from
self-awareness in order for disinhibited consumption to oc-
cur. In other words, if MS participants are forced to face a
mirror during both the manipulation and the consumption
decision, they will be forced to confront the discrepancies
between themselves and cultural standards (Duval and
Wicklund 1972). If they feel they do not meet current stan-
dards of fitness or attractiveness, they might exhibit de-
creased food consumption (relative to a no-mirror condi-
tion), consistent with Goldenberg et al. (2005). However, if
they face a mirror during the manipulation and then are
allowed to move away from the mirror during the con-
sumption decision, they will exhibit increased consumption
(relative to a no-mirror condition) as a method to escape
from self-awareness. Consistent with prior hypotheses, we
expect these effects to occur primarily for LSE consumers.
H3: There will be a three-way interaction among MS,
self-esteem, and manipulated self-awareness.
Among LSE participants who receive an MS
prime, those who are exposed to a mirror and
allowed to escape will consume more than those
who are not exposed to a mirror, who will con-
sume more than those who are exposed to a mir-
ror and not allowed to escape.
EXPERIMENT 2
In this experiment, we sought evidence for an escape from
self-awareness process explanation for our findings in ex-
periment 1. We attempted to replicate the MS# self-esteem
interaction and to demonstrate that escape from self-aware-
ness mediates this effect.
In addition, we altered the control manipulation in this
experiment in order to control for an unintended alternative
explanation for our prior results: that people simply do not
like to think about eating immediately after going to the
dentist. Therefore, we changed the dentist manipulation to
a pain manipulation, which required participants to address
the following: (1) please briefly describe the emotions that
the thought of having a painful medical procedure arouses
in you, and (2) jot down, as specifically as you can, what
you think will happen to you the next time you have a painful
procedure done at your doctor’s office. This control manip-
ulation was designed to produce some mildly negative feel-
ings without producing any death-related thoughts or caus-
ing the participants to lose interest in eating (Arndt et al.
2003).
Before taking the dependent measure (choice of snacks and
drinks from a shopping list), we measured whether partici-
pants wanted to escape from self-awareness. Specifically, par-
ticipants had to choose a place to sit for a later task and could
choose between two chairs: a chair facing a mirror or a chair
facing away from a mirror (Greenberg and Musham 1981).
Choosing to sit in front of a mirror is a reflection of embracing
self-awareness, whereas choosing to sit away from a mirror
is a reflection of escaping a state of self-awareness (Twenge,
Catanese, and Baumeister 2003). Among LSE participants,
we expected those exposed to a mortality prime to be more
likely than those exposed to a control prime to attempt to
escape from self-awareness by choosing the chair facing
away from a mirror. In addition, we expected the choice to
sit facing away from a mirror to mediate the effect of MS
on the purchase quantities for LSE consumers.
Method
This experiment utilized a 2 (MS: death vs. pain) # 2
(self-esteem: low vs. high) between-subjects design. Seventy
participants came to the lab in partial fulfillment of course
requirements. Participants sat in individual cubicles and
completed questionnaire items in the following order: the
Rosenberg (1989) self-esteem scale, several filler question-
naires, the death or pain essay (the manipulation), the
PANAS, and several additional filler items.
Each participant was then led to a separate room in the
same laboratory, containing two chairs with small desks.
One chair was facing a full-size mirror against the wall, and
the other chair was facing a blank wall. The experimenter
told the participant that she or he had to perform the next
task back inside the cubicle (which was in fact the dependent
variable, i.e., picking snacks and drinks from a shopping
list) and, after that, to fill out a final set of questions (which
was in fact a postexperimental questionnaire) outside the
cubicle (in these chairs, either facing the mirror or facing
the wall), because the experimenter needed to prepare the
cubicles for the next participant. The participant chose where
to sit (facing the mirror or facing the wall) to fill out the
final set of questions. The experimenter then placed the
postexperimental questionnaire and a pencil on the desk of
the chosen chair.
Each participant then went back to the original cubicle
to complete the key dependent measure: hypothetical snack
and drink choices for seven consecutive days. They were
told that the products would be purchased from a vending
machine and that the vendor would need to take all of their
orders in advance (Kahn and Isen 1993). They were allowed
to choose as many snacks and soft drinks as they desired
from a variety of brands. Then, participants went to the other
room, where they filled out a postexperimental questionnaire
(on their chosen chair) that tested for their suspicion of any
relatedness between the different phases of the experiment.
None of the participants raised any such suspicion.
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FIGURE 2
EXPERIMENT 2 RESULTS: EFFECTS OF MORTALITY SALIENCE AND SELF-ESTEEM ON (A) THE CHOICE TO SIT AWAY
FROM THE MIRROR AND (B) TOTAL ITEMS SELECTED
Results
Escape from Self-Awareness. There was no significant
main effect of MS or self-esteem on the participants’ choice
to sit away from the mirror (both , NS). How-2x (70)p 2.06
ever, MS and self-esteem interacted in influencing the choice
to sit away from the mirror ( , ), as de-2x (70)p 3.83 pp .05
picted in figure 2. More specifically, LSE participants who
wrote about death chose more frequently to sit away from the
mirror than did LSE participants who wrote about pain (82%
vs. 39%; , ). However, HSE partici-2x (70)p 6.88 pp .01
pants did not differ in their choice to sit away from the mirror
(39% vs. 47%; , NS) as a result of the MS2x (70)p 0.24
manipulation.
Purchase Quantities. We performed a 2 (MS: death
vs. pain) # 2 (self-esteem: low vs. high) between-subjects
ANOVA on the total number of items chosen. The ANOVA
revealed a main effect of MS ( , ). Par-F(1, 66)p 6.06 p ! .05
ticipants who completed the death essay chose more items
( ) than did participants who completed the painMp 27.97
essay ( ). In addition, LSE participants chose moreMp 24.20
items ( ) than did HSE participants ( ;Mp 28.34 Mp 23.83
, ). However, both main effects wereF(1, 66)p 8.51 p ! .01
qualified by an MS # self-esteem interaction (F(1, 66)p
, ; see fig. 2). As in experiment 1, the MS effect4.70 p ! .05
was only significant for LSE participants ( ,F(1, 66)p 10.71
) but not for HSE participants ( , ).p ! .01 F(1, 66) ! 1 p 1 .83
LSE participants chose more items from the grocery list in the
MS condition ( ) compared to the pain conditionMp 32.12
( ). For HSE participants, there was no significantMp 24.78
difference between the MS and the pain condition (Mp
vs. 23.59). We also ran separate analyses on the total24.06
number of snacks and drinks, and these analyses yielded results
similar to the analysis on the total number of items chosen.
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Mediation Analyses. Our theoretical framework pro-
posed a case of mediated moderation (Muller, Judd, and
Yzerbyt 2005), where self-esteem moderates the effect of
MS on the mediator, escape from self-awareness, which in
turn influences consumption behavior. We tested mediated
moderation with three models (Muller et al. 2005). The first
model examines the effects of MS, self-esteem, and the MS
# self-esteem interaction on the dependent variable (the
total number of items chosen). This model confirmed the
earlier reported interaction between MS and self-esteem on
the total number of items chosen ( , ,bp 0.24 tp 2.17
). The second model examined the effects of MS,p ! .05
self-esteem, and the MS # self-esteem interaction on the
mediator (choice to sit away from the mirror) and confirmed
the MS # self-esteem interaction on the mediator (bp
, , ). The third model added the mediator0.26 tp 2.25 p ! .05
(choice to sit away from the mirror), and the interaction
between self-esteem and the mediator, to the original model.
In this model, the MS # self-esteem interaction was no
longer significant ( , , ), but thebp 0.07 tp 0.69 p 1 .48
choice to sit away from the mirror had a significant effect
on the number of items chosen ( , ,bp 0.40 tp 3.95 p !
). A Sobel (1982) test revealed that the decrease in the.01
direct effect of the interaction effect of MS and self-esteem
was statistically significant ( , ). Thus, thezp 1.98 pp .05
choice to sit away from the mirror is supported as a mediator
of the effect of MS and self-esteem on the total number of
items chosen.
Discussion
Experiment 2 provides further support that self-esteem
moderates the effect of MS on consumers’ choices for snacks
and drinks. In addition, the results of this experiment support
hypothesis 2, which proposed that, for LSE consumers, es-
cape from self-awareness would mediate the relationship
between MS and consumption quantity. Indeed, we found
that LSE but not HSE participants wanted to escape from
self-awareness when faced with a mortality threat. More
LSE participants chose a chair that was facing away from
a mirror after an MS prime than after a pain prime. This
finding strongly supports our proposition that LSE consum-
ers are in a state of escape from self-awareness when threat-
ened by an MS activation. In contrast, HSE participants did
not differ in their chair choice as a function of the prime.
They did not attempt to escape from self-awareness, pre-
sumably because they have sufficient ego resources to
counter this threat.
EXPERIMENT 3
In experiment 3, we attempted to replicate our basic find-
ing (the interaction between MS and self-esteem on con-
sumption) and the mediational pattern in experiment 2 while
using a different dependent variable (cookie eating) and a
different measure of escape from self-awareness (a pronoun-
usage task). Escape from self-awareness theory suggests that
people often try to escape by focusing on immediate sen-
sations such as eating food (Heatherton and Baumeister
1991), which may lead to overconsumption. Although the
findings of our previous experiments support our proposition
that LSE individuals overconsume because they want to
escape self-awareness, one could still argue that selecting
hypothetical items from a list seems quite different from
consuming food. Heatherton and Baumeister (1991) argue
that individuals can escape self-awareness by consuming
food because they are able to focus on ongoing physical
sensations, which might not be true when simply checking
items off a shopping list. Therefore, to generalize our effects,
we measure participants’ actual rather than hypothetical eat-
ing behavior in experiment 3 by using a cookie-tasting para-
digm (adapted from Mills et al. 2002).
Method
One hundred and three undergraduates participated as par-
tial fulfillment of course requirements. As in prior experi-
ments, this experiment had a 2 (MS: death vs. pain) # 2
(self-esteem: low vs. high) between-subjects design. Partic-
ipants came to the lab, sat in individual cubicles, and were
told that they would participate in a series of unrelated tasks.
They first filled out a series of questionnaires, including the
Rosenberg self-esteem scale. Then, participants were ran-
domly assigned to either the death essay or pain essay con-
dition. Subsequently, they filled out the PANAS and several
filler questions.
Next, participants completed a foreign language task, in
which they examined a short story in a foreign language
(Cyrillic Russian); 50 pronouns were underlined, and they
had to guess the correct translation of each of the 50 pro-
nouns. Our main interest was the number of first-person
pronouns (I, me, my, myself, mine) that participants used
in their translations. The use of first-person pronouns reflects
one’s level of self-awareness (Davis and Brock 1978), and
using fewer first-person pronouns than usual reflects a desire
to escape from self-awareness (Arndt et al. 1998).
After completing the translation task, participants were
brought individually to an adjacent room where three plates
were piled with three different flavors of small, freshly baked
cookies. Each plate contained 15 cookies. The experimenter
told each participant that a company wanted to test a new
brand of cookie dough before it came on the market and
that they would like to know which flavor tasted the best.
Participants had to take one cookie per plate, taste it, and
rate the cookie. They received a rating form per plate, on
which they could rate the cookie on several dimensions. To
make the cover story even more believable, participants
were also asked to drink a little water between tasting each
cookie. Participants were told that after all ratings were
completed that they could help themselves to as many cook-
ies as they wanted because the lab received more than
enough cookies from the company. After the participants
left the room, the experimenter counted the number of cook-
ies that participants ate.
Finally, participants filled out a postexperimental ques-
tionnaire. None of the participants raised any suspicion
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about any of the manipulations or any relatedness between
the different phases of the experiment. In addition, none of
the participants was familiar with Russian.
Results
Escape from Self-Awareness. We counted the number
of first-person pronouns each participant used to translate
the foreign text. We then conducted a 2 (MS: death vs. pain)
# 2 (self-esteem: low vs. high) between-subjects ANOVA
on the total number of first-person pronouns. There was a
significant main effect of MS ( , );F(1, 99)p 4.23 p ! .05
MS participants used fewer first-person pronouns (Mp
) than did control participants ( ). There was26.52 Mp 28.86
also a main effect of self-esteem ( ,F(1, 99)p 6.23 p !
); LSE participants used fewer first-person pronouns.05
( ) than did HSE participants ( ). How-Mp 26.27 Mp 29.12
ever, both independent variables interacted significantly with
each other ( , ). The effect of MS wasF(1, 99)p 8.10 p ! .01
only significant for LSE participants ( ,F(1, 99)p 12.14
) but not for HSE participants ( ,p ! .001 F(1, 99)p 0.31
). LSE participants in the MS condition used fewerp 1 .50
first-person pronouns ( ) compared to those in theMp 23.48
pain condition ( ). HSE participants’ use of first-Mp 29.06
person pronouns did not differ between the two conditions
( vs. 28.66).Mp 29.56
Cookie Intake. We also performed a 2 (MS: death vs.
pain) # 2 (self-esteem: low vs. high) between-subjects
ANOVA on the total number of cookies eaten. The ANOVA
revealed a main effect of MS ( , ). Par-F(1, 99)p 5.53 p ! .05
ticipants in the MS condition ate more cookies ( )Mp 5.17
than did participants in the pain condition ( ). ThereMp 4.39
was also a main effect of self-esteem ( ,F(1, 99)p 7.28 p !
). LSE participants ate more cookies ( ) than did.01 Mp 5.23
HSE consumers ( ). Both main effects were quali-Mp 4.33
fied by the MS # self-esteem interaction ( ,F(1, 99)p 4.15
). The MS effect was significant for LSE consumersp ! .05
( , ). LSE consumers ate more cookiesF(1, 99)p 9.73 p ! .01
in the MS condition ( ) compared to the pain con-Mp 5.96
dition ( ). For HSE consumers, there was no sig-Mp 4.50
nificant difference between the MS and the pain condition
( vs. 4.28; , ).Mp 4.38 F(1, 99)p 0.05 p 1 .50
Mediation Analysis. As in experiment 2, we examined
whether self-esteem moderates the effect of MS on our me-
diator, escape from self-awareness, which in turn should in-
fluence eating behavior, by following a mediated moderation
approach (Muller et al. 2005). The first model indicated a
significant MS # self-esteem interaction on the dependent
variable (total number of cookies eaten; ,bp 0.19 tp
, ). The second model revealed a significant2.04 p ! .05
MS # self-esteem interaction on the mediator (number of
first-person pronouns used; , ,bp 0.26 tp 2.84 p !
). The third model revealed that the effect of the MS #.01
self-esteem interaction on the number of cookies eaten be-
came nonsignificant ( , , ), whereasbp 0.03 tp 0.32 p 1 .75
the number of first-person pronouns had a significant effect
on the number of cookies eaten ( , ,bp 0.56 tp 6.51
). A Sobel (1982) test revealed that the decrease inp ! .01
the direct effect of the interaction effect of MS and self-
esteem was statistically significant ( , ).zp 2.61 p ! .01
Thus, the number of first-person pronouns used for trans-
lation is supported as a mediator of the effect of MS and
self-esteem on the total number of cookies eaten.
Discussion
Experiment 3 replicated the mediational pattern found in
experiment 2, using a different dependent variable and a
different mediator. Instead of using the shopping list task,
in which participants had to select products for consumption,
we measured actual consumption of cookies. We measured
escape from self-awareness by counting the number of first-
person pronouns that participants used to translate a foreign
language and found that LSE individuals used fewer first-
person pronouns in the MS condition than in the pain con-
dition, reflecting a state of escape from self-awareness. Fur-
ther, this state affected their eating behavior. LSE individuals
ate more in the MS condition than in the pain condition,
and this effect of MS on cookie eating was mediated by the
number of first-person pronouns used. In contrast, HSE con-
sumers did not differ in their state of self-awareness and
cookie eating between the MS and pain conditions. In ex-
periment 4, we examine whether further heightening the
level of self-awareness strengthens the effect of MS on con-
sumption quantities for LSE consumers.
EXPERIMENT 4
In the previous two experiments, we examined to what
extent escape from self-awareness mediated the effects of
MS on consumption behavior. In experiment 4, we attempt
to find additional evidence for our proposed mechanism by
manipulating the level of self-awareness. To test hypothesis
3, we examine whether the manipulated level of self-aware-
ness interacts with MS and self-esteem in determining the
number of snacks and drinks participants choose from a
shopping list.
In prior research, self-awareness has been manipulated by
placing participants in front of a mirror (Duval and Wicklund
1972; Pryor et al. 1977). Following this paradigm, we used
three self-awareness (SA) conditions. In the “SA-escape”
condition, participants were exposed to a mirror while writ-
ing an essay about either death or pain. Then, during sub-
sequent tasks (i.e., picking snacks and drinks for future con-
sumption), participants were no longer exposed to the mirror.
By removing the mirror, we allowed participants to escape
from this heightened self-awareness state (Dixon and Bau-
meister 1991). In the “SA–no escape” condition, participants
faced the mirror while both writing about death (or pain)
and picking snacks and drinks. By constantly sitting in front
of the mirror, participants did not have a chance to escape
from self-awareness. Finally, in the “no-SA” condition, par-
ticipants were not exposed to a mirror at all, similar to earlier
experiments. We expected, in line with earlier experiments,
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that HSE consumers would not be affected by the level of
self-awareness or by the MS manipulation. LSE consumers,
however, should be strongly affected by both the MS ma-
nipulation and the manipulated level of self-awareness.
In both the SA-escape condition and the no-SA condition,
we expected that LSE consumers would want to purchase
more snacks and drinks when they wrote about death, com-
pared to when they wrote about pain, due to a desire to
escape from self-awareness. Furthermore, we expected a
higher level of purchasing in the SA-escape condition com-
pared to the no-SA condition, because the presence of a
mirror heightens the level of self-awareness, making MS
feel even more aversive (Arndt et al. 1998) and thus in-
creasing the need to escape. However, in the SA–no escape
condition, participants were constantly exposed to a mirror
and thus were unable to escape from self-awareness. Based
on classic self-awareness findings (Pryor et al. 1977; Scheier
and Carver 1977), we expected that when participants were
forced to remain in an aversive state of high self-awareness,
they would have no choice but to attempt to live up to
societal standards, perhaps even by reducing their food-con-
sumption levels (Goldenberg et al. 2005).
Method
This experiment utilized a 3 (self-awareness: SA-escape
vs. SA–no escape vs. no-SA) # 2 (MS: death vs. pain)#
2 (self-esteem: low vs. high) between-subjects design. One
hundred and fifty-one participants came to the lab in partial
fulfillment of course requirements. Two participants did not
complete the full experiment and were therefore omitted
from later data analyses. Hence, 149 participants were in-
cluded in the data set.
A week before the experiment took place, participants
completed the Rosenberg self-esteem scale. Upon arrival in
the lab, participants were placed in individual cubicles and
told that they would participate in several unrelated studies.
Participants in the SA-escape and SA–no escape conditions
sat in a cubicle that was equipped with a mirror facing the
participants. Participants in the no-SA condition sat in a
cubicle that was not equipped with a mirror. While sitting
in these cubicles, participants completed either the death
essay or pain essay, as in prior experiments. Subsequently,
they filled out the PANAS and several filler questions.
Participants were then told that the experimenter needed
to use the computer in his or her cubicle and, therefore, they
were asked to perform the next task in an adjacent cubicle.
Participants in the SA–no escape condition moved to a cu-
bicle that was also equipped with a mirror facing the par-
ticipant. Participants in the SA-escape condition and no-SA
condition moved to a cubicle that was not equipped with a
mirror. Participants then chose hypothetical snacks and
drinks from a shopping list, as in prior studies. They ended
the experiment by completing a postexperimental question-
naire, which revealed that none of the participants indicated
any suspicion about the manipulations or relatedness be-
tween the different tasks of the experiment.
Results
We performed a 3 (self-awareness: SA-escape vs. SA–no
escape vs. no-SA) # 2 (MS: death vs. pain) # 2 (self-
esteem: low vs. high) between-subjects ANOVA on the total
number of items chosen. The ANOVA revealed a main ef-
fect of self-awareness ( , ). Par-F(2, 137)p 24.12 p ! .001
ticipants in the SA-escape condition chose more items
( ) than did participants in the no-SA conditionMp 25.16
( ), who in turn chose more items than partici-Mp 22.90
pants in the SA–no escape condition ( ). ThereMp 19.17
was also a main effect of self-esteem ( ,F(1, 137)p 9.32
). LSE participants chose more items ( )p ! .01 Mp 23.67
than did HSE participants ( ). We also obtainedMp 21.58
a significant three-way interaction among self-awareness,
MS, and self-esteem ( , ), supportingF(2, 137)p 6.20 p ! .01
hypothesis 3 (see fig. 3).
As expected, MS did not influence the purchase quantities
of HSE consumers in any of the three self-awareness con-
ditions (values of and ). In contrast, MS hadF ! 1 p 1 .40
a significant effect on the purchase quantities of LSE con-
sumers in all three self-awareness conditions. LSE consum-
ers who wrote about death purchased more items than LSE
consumers who wrote about pain in the SA-escape condition
( vs. ; , )Mp 30.93 Mp 26.83 F(1, 137)p 7.32 p ! .01
and the no-SA condition ( vs. ;Mp 26.42 Mp 21.54
, ). However, LSE consumers whoF(1, 137)p 10.03 p ! .01
wrote about death purchased marginally fewer items than
LSE consumers who wrote about pain in the SA–no escape
condition ( vs. ; ,Mp 16.17 Mp 19.08 F(1, 137)p 3.45
). Further post hoc analyses (Tukey HSD) revealedp ! .06
that LSE consumers who wrote about death purchased more
items in the SA-escape condition than in the no-SA con-
dition ( ), in which they purchased more than in thep ! .05
SA–no escape condition ( ). In addition, LSE con-p ! .05
sumers who wrote about pain purchased more items in the
SA-escape condition than those in the no-SA condition and
the SA–no escape conditions ( ), with the latter twop ! .05
conditions not significantly different from each other.
Discussion
In this experiment, we manipulated the level of self-
awareness and whether participants were able to escape from
it and examined its moderating role on the effect of MS and
self-esteem on purchase quantities. We replicated earlier
findings in the no-SA condition: participants who wrote
about death purchased higher quantities of snacks and drinks
compared to participants who wrote about pain. In the SA-
escape condition, where participants were only exposed to
the mirror during the essay task (but not during the shopping
list task), we also found that participants who wrote about
death purchased higher quantities of items than participants
who wrote about pain. However, participants who wrote
about either death or pain consumed more in the SA-escape
condition than in the no-SA condition. Hence, comparing
the no-SA condition and the SA-escape condition, we find
additive effects of MS and self-awareness on the chosen
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FIGURE 3
EXPERIMENT 4 RESULTS: THE EFFECTS OF MORTALITY SALIENCE AND SELF-AWARENESS ON TOTAL ITEMS SELECTED
FOR LOW- AND HIGH-SELF-ESTEEM CONSUMERS
number of snacks and drinks. Both MS and the mirror are
sources of increased self-awareness and, because partici-
pants are given the chance to escape from self-awareness,
these sources lead separately (in the case of participants who
write about death in the control self-awareness condition
and participants who write about pain in the escape from
self-awareness condition) to increased consumption. When
both sources are combined (in the case of participants who
write about their own death in the escape from self-aware-
ness condition), participants purchase even more snacks and
drinks.
In the SA–no escape condition, in which participants were
constantly exposed to the mirror and not able to escape, those
who wrote about death did not pursue higher quantities of
snacks and drinks compared to participants who wrote about
pain. In fact, participants who wrote about death actually
purchased marginally fewer snacks and drinks than partici-
pants who wrote about pain. This finding is consistent with
early self-awareness research (Pryor et al. 1977; Scheier and
Carver 1977), in which individuals are unable to escape self-
awareness and thus must attempt to change behavior in order
to reduce ideal-actual self-discrepancies. This result is also in
line with the research by Goldenberg et al. (2005), who found
that MS can decrease consumption levels when upward social
comparisons are made. When individuals remain in such un-
comfortable situations during the consumption decision, they
are likely to restrict consumption.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The human animal is a beast that dies and if he’s got money
he buys and buys and buys and I think the reason he buys
everything he can buy is that in the back of his mind he has
the crazy hope that one of his purchases will be life everlasting!
(Tennessee Williams, Cat on a Hot Tin Roof)
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The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001,
as well as world events such as hurricanes and tsunamis,
have dramatically increased the salience of death-related
thoughts for many individuals (Pyszczynski et al. 2003).
While MS is not chronically accessible, it is frequently ac-
cessible among many individuals, and one way in which
they may cope is through their consumption behavior. Re-
ports following 9/11 suggested that consumers engaged
themselves in excessive eating, as well as excessive spend-
ing, compared to before the attacks. For example, both Bas-
kin-Robbins and Safeway supermarkets reported increased
sales immediately following 9/11 (Hubler 2001).
Our results support this anecdotal evidence that increasing
MS leads to more excessive consumption patterns. Thoughts
of death lead to the potential for anxiety (Greenberg et al.
2003), and individuals, particularly those with low self-
esteem, may try to prevent experiencing actual anxiety by
engaging in actions that allow them to escape from self-
awareness. Furthermore, we demonstrated that the effect of
MS on the consumption behavior of LSE individuals was
mediated by a desire to escape from self-awareness (mea-
sured by either choosing a chair to sit away from a mirror
or the decreased use of first-person pronouns). This media-
tional evidence provides strong support for an escape-from-
self-awareness explanation for our results. Finally, we dem-
onstrated that increasing self-awareness even further by
placing participants in front of a mirror strengthens the ef-
fects of MS on consumption. Hence, across four studies we
demonstrated that MS leads to increased consumption for
LSE consumers but not for HSE consumers. Only when
LSE consumers do not have the opportunity to escape from
a state of heightened self-awareness does MS lead to de-
creased consumption.
Researchers inspired by terror management theory have
devoted much effort to uncovering the ways in which in-
dividuals deal with the threat of death. In addition to the
two established MS defense strategies (defending the pre-
dominant cultural worldview and bolstering self-esteem),
researchers have recently started to examine other defense
strategies, such as nostalgia proneness (Routledge et al.
2008) or attachment-related defensive actions (Hart, Shaver,
and Goldenberg 2005). Hart et al. (2005, 1011) suggest that
“other provocative possibilities for defensive mechanisms
may be found in basic and common activities such as eating
(e.g., comfort food), shopping, sexual activity, and enter-
tainment.” In fact, our findings are completely in line with
their plea for novel defensive mechanisms against the threat
of death. In four studies, we support our proposition that
MS may lead to an escape-from-self-awareness strategy for
consumers with low self-esteem.
Our findings contribute to the literature in several ways.
We are the first to show that MS can lead consumers to
engage in higher levels of overall consumption, in terms of
both planning purchases of food and drinks and actual eating
behavior. Furthermore, we contribute to the psychology lit-
erature by establishing a mechanism (escape from self-
awareness) by which consumers overconsume in an attempt
to cope with the fear of death. We also add to a growing
body of literature that addresses the subtle, nonconscious
effects of the activation of self-related goal pursuits on hu-
man behavior (Bargh 2002).
Our research differs significantly from that of Ferraro et
al. (2005), who demonstrated that MS leads consumers to
make a specific choice among two product alternatives (fruit
salad vs. chocolate cake). These authors were more inter-
ested in how female consumers’ body esteem played a role
in the choice for a specific product in the face of MS. In
contrast, we were not interested in the specific dietary choice
among a set of alternatives but rather in how MS can affect
the total amount of consumption. This research also signif-
icantly differs from the work of Kasser and Sheldon (2000),
who suggested that MS leads individuals to demonstrate
more materialistic values. Participants in their studies pre-
dicted higher salaries for themselves in the future and took
more allocations from a resource dilemma. However, Kasser
and Sheldon (2000) did not use a standard materialism scale
(Richins and Dawson 1992), but rather a scale about per-
sonal strivings, and measured materialism as a high rating
on the strivings for an attractive appearance, social recog-
nition, and financial success. In contrast, our research ex-
amines the effect of MS on the desire for everyday con-
sumable products rather than luxury brands such as Lexus
or Rolex that might demonstrate one’s financial status (Man-
del and Heine 1999). Our findings suggest that MS partic-
ipants in Kasser and Sheldon’s (2000) and Mandel and
Heine’s (1999) research may have desired a higher salary
and/or luxury brands in order to increase overall consump-
tion and spending rather than as a means to display status
or wealth. Furthermore, in experiment 3 we demonstrate
MS effects on actual eating behavior, in contrast to the hy-
pothetical choices made by participants in the prior research
cited above.
There are also several limitations to our current research.
First, our participants were limited to American and Euro-
pean undergraduate business students. It would be worth-
while to study other individual differences. For instance,
would the effects be stronger for older individuals, who are
closer to death, due to an even shorter, more compressed
time horizon? Moreover, our results might not apply as
strongly to cultures in which excessive consumption is not
valued as highly. In addition, it is unclear from our results
whether the escape-from-self-awareness strategy relies
mainly on overconsumption of food and drinks or over-
spending in general. In particular, the consumption of glu-
cose-laden products seems to aid individuals in acts of self-
control, including suppression of thoughts about death
(Gailliot et al. 2007). Future research might explore whether
an increased consumption quantity of nonfood consumables
(such as music downloads) can also help LSE individuals
to escape from self-awareness.
One alternative account for our findings is a survival or
self-preservation explanation. Humans have evolved to
hoard excess calories as a means for survival during a famine
(Burnham and Phelan 2000). Therefore, MS may lead to
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increased food consumption not as a way to escape self-
awareness but rather because it triggers a survival instinct,
which may cause people to consume more calories. How-
ever, our particular pattern of results does not support this
explanation. A survival mechanism should occur equally for
LSE and HSE consumers, or perhaps be even stronger for
HSE consumers, who may feel they have more to lose. In
contrast, we found a stronger effect for LSE consumers than
for HSE consumers. This particular pattern of results is also
inconsistent with a self-regulatory explanation. Gailliot et
al. (2006) demonstrated that MS participants performed
worse on tasks that require self-regulation, such as resolving
anagrams or analytical reasoning problems, compared to
control participants. However, their effects were not mod-
erated by self-esteem, contrary to the majority of findings
in the MS literature (Pyszczynski et al. 2004). In support
of their findings, Gailliot et al. (2006) argued that self-
regulatory effects of MS occur independently of self-esteem.
In contrast, our studies consistently demonstrated MS effects
that were moderated by self-esteem. Therefore, self-regu-
lation does not appear to provide the best explanation for
our findings.
An interesting question is why participants needed to take
two separate actions in order to escape from self-awareness:
both choosing to sit away from the mirror and purchasing
more snacks (experiment 2), and both using fewer pronouns
in the translation task and eating more cookies (experiment
3). The pronoun-usage and mirror tasks are well-established
measures of a desire to escape from self-awareness (Twenge
et al. 2003), but they do not necessarily accomplish the task.
The quantity of consumption reflects the actual attempt to
escape self-awareness, and prior evidence suggests that it is
often effective (Heatherton and Baumeister 1991). However,
the fact that LSE participants want to escape from self-
awareness does not mean that they can simply turn off self-
awareness. Escaping basically means that self-awareness is
turned to a very low level. This often happens through a
state of cognitive deconstruction (Baumeister 1990), which
can evoke several specific mind-sets such as constricted tem-
poral focus, concrete thinking, focusing on immediate goals,
or cognitive rigidity. Future research may provide more in-
sights into the process by which LSE consumers engage in
cognitive deconstruction as a means to escape from self-
awareness, as well as the change in self-awareness levels
after various attempts to escape.
Our results suggest several additional avenues for future
research. For example, it might be interesting to investigate
whether MS effects on product consumption are brand-
specific. MS activates nationalistic concepts in people
(Arndt, Greenberg, and Cook 2002). Therefore, MS may
induce consumer ethnocentrism, causing consumers to de-
velop more positive attitudes toward (and thus higher con-
sumption of) domestic brands versus nondomestic brands
(Maheswaran and Agrawal 2004). Another possibility for
future research would be to investigate whether MS affects
the timing of consumption. MS might cause individuals to
adopt a limited time horizon, thereby placing more value
on immediate consumption relative to delayed consumption.
Because they believe that they might die soon, MS indi-
viduals might prefer to spend their money on items that can
be consumed immediately, rather than save their money,
which will be useless to them upon their deaths.
Our findings may also have practical implications. Con-
sumers, especially those with a lower self-esteem, might be
more susceptible to overconsumption when confronted with
images of death during the news or their favorite crime scene
investigation shows. Another interesting question is whether
putting a mirror (or a picture of oneself) on the refrigerator
can help curb overeating. Our results suggest that such a
strategy would work only if the mirror (or picture) remains
visible during the act of consumption. One possible avenue
for future research is identifying healthier strategies, rather
than overconsuming, in which consumers can deal with ex-
istential threats.
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